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On 12 August 1942, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill arrived in Moscow to 
meet Soviet leader Josef Stalin, for the first time, a mission that Churchill’s wife, 
Clementine, had described to him as a “visit to the Ogre in his Den.”1 Churchill had, by 
his own account, attempted to strangle the Bolshevik state at birth, by supporting British 
intervention on the side of the White Russian counter-revolutionaries in 1918-19. His 
arrival in Moscow was a dramatic illustration of the way the actions of Adolf Hitler had 
altered international politics. However, in histories of the coalition of Britain, the United 
States and the Soviet Union that came together to defeat Hitler, this mission of Churchill 
plays a small and insignificant part.2  Indeed it is often barely mentioned, though for its 
historic symbolism, one might rank Churchill’s meeting with Stalin as on a par with U.S. 
President Richard Nixon’s meeting with Chairman Mao Zedong in Beijing in 1972. It 
will be shown here that Churchill’s mission should not be dismissed so lightly when 
examining the early development of that strange coalition commonly called the “Big 
Three.” Churchill’s meetings with Stalin established, despite great setbacks in the middle 
period of the mission, that this alliance could function as a viable entity, so long as all 
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parties agreed tacitly to certain rules of engagement. It is often suggested that the third 
member of the Big Three, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, was largely responsible for 
establishing this pragmatic approach, but this article will show that Churchill and Stalin 
became alive to the wisdom of managing their interactions in this manner independently 
of Roosevelt, and indeed some way in advance of his active involvement in Big Three 
politics. 
More attention has been paid to Churchill’s second visit to Moscow, in October 
1944, in which he made his infamous suggestion regarding “percentages” of influence in 
Eastern Europe, than to his first visit to Moscow (code-named BRACELET) two years 
earlier.3
Historians who have devoted serious attention to Churchill’s attitudes have 
preferred not to present them in quite so stark a form as the narrative described above, 
 The personal interactions between Churchill and Stalin have always had a 
problematic place in the traditional, but enduring, narrative of Churchill’s wartime views 
of the USSR, and of Churchill himself as war-leader. The prominent theme of that 
narrative, established by Churchill himself, was his “eyes-open” attitude: open to wartime 
co-operation, but without letting delusions about the USSR or Stalin get in the way, and 
always aware of Stalin’s designs on Eastern Europe. BRACELET does not obviously fit the 
customary themes of discourse on Churchill, for it neither held a strong message as to 
Churchill’s far-sightedness regarding a Soviet threat, nor did it involve the issues 
appealing to those whose interest in Second World War diplomacy is shaped by their 
search for the origins of the Cold War. However, a fresh look at the motivations of 
Churchill in making the trip and what took place in Moscow is well worthwhile in order 
to enhance our understanding of wartime diplomacy, for it sheds light on the developing 
pattern of the wartime “Grand Alliance” at a time when there was much still to be settled 
as to how it would be conducted. 
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even though it remains potent in accounts of Churchill for a general readership. What 
tends to divide such historians is the degree to which they find consistency in Churchill’s 
views and attitudes. There are those such as David Carlton and John Charmley, who, 
from different perspectives, find Churchill essentially continuing to be influenced by his 
long-standing views of Bolshevism.4 Conversely, David Reynolds, Robin Edmonds and 
Martin Kitchen find Churchill more inconsistent with his past, though wavering between 
that view and one that was more inclined to see co-operation with the Soviets as a 
realistic possibility.5 Churchill’s doctor Sir Charles Wilson (later Lord Moran) recorded 
Churchill’s desire to work with Stalin, as well as his doubts about the Soviet leader. 
Wilson put Churchill’s inconsistency down to fluctuations in his health.6
To an extent, Churchill operated on the basis of a specific conceptualisation of 
both his great allies. He constructed an image of Franklin Roosevelt that only partly 
reflected the reality of that complex individual (and contained a certain element of 
 Churchill’s 
attitudes were certainly neither straightforward, nor consistent, but were more the result 
of conflicting elements in his attitudes to communism (domestic and Soviet), to the 
USSR and to Stalin, magnified by, but not entirely created by, the conditions of co-
belligerency. Examination of Churchill’s first contacts with Stalin in person demonstrate 
that though his attitudes to Bolshevism were immutable, his attitudes to Stalin were not. 
Appreciation of the degree to which Stalin moved away from being simply a 
personification for Churchill of Bolshevism’s worst excesses is central to understanding 
the paradoxical nature of his attitudes as they developed in the period of the alliance, 
1941-45. In engaging with Stalin as a (fellow) warlord, Churchill was able to reconcile 
his conflicting impulses, simultaneously to embrace the Soviets as powerful and 
significant partners in his self-defined mission to crush Hitler, and to recoil from them 
out of suspicion about their methods, their past and their objectives.  
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romanticisation and wishful thinking).7 Roosevelt became the personification to 
Churchill of the America that Britain needed it to be, and there are good grounds for 
arguing that Churchill did the same with regard to Stalin, though with more equivocation. 
It was more frequent with Stalin than with Roosevelt that the Soviet leader’s own 
behaviour raised conflicting reactions and characterisations—often the difference was 
between the telegraphic Stalin and the personal Stalin—though the record does show a 
few private occasions when Churchill showed his awareness that Roosevelt, too, was not 
conforming to Churchill’s preferred image.8
In the case of Stalin, Churchill came to alight on an image of him as warrior-
leader, and then proceeded to conceive of their relationship as a “comradeship-in-arms” 
(reflecting his own self-image, too), a term he never used in association with Roosevelt. 
It was the quest for such a Stalin that took Churchill to Moscow in August 1942. The 
ostensible reason, and the one always reported by historians, was to convey the news that 
the British and Americans were not intending to open a second front in Western Europe 
in 1942, but there was no reason why Churchill himself had to take that news personally, 
and many reasons why he should not do so, including the old dictum about messengers 
bringing bad news. Neither before nor later was there any reluctance to send Stalin bad 
news either by telegram or by ambassadorial interview. The actual purpose of Churchill’s 
trip was much more significant, being a matter of the nature and conduct of the wartime 
alliance as a whole, and the Churchill-Stalin comradeship that would be at the heart of 
it—if all went well. The mission, and the way that events on it unfolded only really make 
sense if viewed through this prism.  
  
 Churchill’s antipathy to Bolshevism as an ideological movement is, of course, 
well-documented and beyond doubt. It is a matter of more debate, however, as to how far 
that hostility was always replicated in his attitude to the USSR as a state. Certainly, for 
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much of the time, Churchill would not have distinguished between the two: yet there is 
evidence that at times he did so—that he detected in the Soviet Union in essence the old 
Russia. In particular, as the threat from Nazi Germany grew during the 1930s, so he saw 
the possibilities of the USSR playing a more traditional role in the balance of power. This 
perception was no doubt strengthened by the obvious danger that Hitler posed to the 
USSR and influenced by the more “civilised” diplomatic behaviour of Foreign 
Commissar Maxim Litvinov from 1933 to 1939. Churchill was among the wide circle of 
opposition and anti-appeasing figures cultivated by the irrepressible Soviet Ambassador 
in London, Ivan Maisky.9 Thus he was to be found advocating an alliance with the USSR 
in his newspaper column in 1939, and even after the Soviets cynically shared in the 
division of Poland with Germany in the autumn of 1939, he publicly stated that there was 
a good possibility that British and Soviet interests would coincide.10 It was soon after this 
that he made his often-quoted remark about Soviet policy being a mystery inside a riddle, 
wrapped in an enigma.11 What is often overlooked is that at that time, most observers, 
including leading figures in the British and French Governments, found Soviet policy far 
from enigmatic—indeed they saw the Soviets as acting clearly and unambiguously in 
cahoots with the Nazis. Churchill was, by contrast, suggesting that there was a distance 
between the two, that the Soviets and Nazis were not the same—as many people were 
saying—and that they could easily realign in a way more favourable to Britain. This did 
not, however, prevent Churchill vigorously supporting moves in January 1940 to send 
troops to aid the Finns in their war against the Soviets, in the hopes of cutting German 
access to Swedish iron ore along the way: Churchill at this time faced the military 
prospect of war with the Soviets with equanimity, sharing the common view that they 
were militarily decrepit. Communism, he said publicly at the height of the Finnish-Soviet 
war, “rots the soul of a nation.”12 
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 All this notwithstanding, his attitudes towards the Soviet Union, even if it was the 
fountainhead of Bolshevism, were clearly changeable according to the developments of 
international politics, and to this extent it is clear that he regarded the Soviet leadership in 
a sense as realists. He had, in fact, had no contact with that leadership, with the exception 
of his informal contacts with Maisky before the war. He had said little about Stalin 
himself, who simply represented the grim, dark figure at the centre of the Bolshevik 
menace. This position was to continue during the first year of his premiership. He sent 
only two messages to Stalin, neither of which received a reply. The first was an appeal to 
Soviet realism, by setting out the situation resulting from German victories in the West, 
and inviting Stalin to consider their impact on Soviet interests. It was intended to gain Sir 
Stafford Cripps, the new ambassador to Moscow, a meeting with Stalin. It achieved this, 
only to prompt from Stalin comments to Cripps that discouraged any further contacts by 
apparently aligning himself with those who sought to alter the “old equilibrium” in 
Europe.13
Churchill, however, continued to see Stalin as essentially a realist, and it was as a 
result of this assumption that his second message was sent, in April 1941. Again it was a 
short, deliberately matter-of-fact message, in which Churchill, in suitably disguised form, 
informed Stalin of intelligence that he had gained from Ultra decrypts, pointing to a 
German military build-up, preparatory to an attack on the Soviet Union.
  
14 The message 
was delayed in transmission by Cripps, who was attempting his own, more complicated, 
demarche at the same time. Churchill was particularly annoyed at Cripps, and later said 
that relations might have been easier at the start of the Anglo-Soviet relationship had the 
message been delivered in a timely fashion.15 When he met Stalin in August 1942, this 
was still on Churchill’s mind, for he asked Stalin about it. Churchill had made no further 
attempt to communicate with Stalin, and re-stated his realist interpretation by 
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commenting to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that it was best to let the Soviets draw 
their own conclusions from the facts, rather than run after them with “frantic efforts to 
assure them of your love.”16
This attitude was generally to continue to characterise Churchill’s attitude towards 
his new ally for the first twelve months after the German attack on the Soviet Union. 
When signals intelligence made it clear that Germany was going to attack the Soviet 
Union in June 1941, there was debate within the British Government as to whether to 
welcome the USSR as an ally. While there was never any consideration of following the 
course that some conservative revisionists have suggested would have been wise—of 
coming to terms with Hitler now he was focused on the Soviets—there was a clear sense 
at that time that alliance with the Soviets was a matter of choice and was not simply 
dictated by the force of events.
 
17 While Eden offered Maisky the despatch of a military 
mission to Moscow, Churchill assured Roosevelt that there was no question of a close 
alliance. Eden and the Minister for Information, Alfred Duff Cooper, argued that fifty per 
cent of British public opinion would be hostile to such an alliance.18
No one has been a more consistent opponent of 
Communism than I have for the last twenty-five years. I 
will unsay no word that I have said about it. But all this 
fades away before the spectacle which is now unfolding. 
The past with its crimes, its follies, its tragedies flashes 
away. I see the Russian soldiers standing on the threshold 
 Churchill, however, 
in his broadcast to the nation on the evening of the day that Germany attacked the Soviet 
Union, aligned Britain with the cause of a people he characterised as fighting for their 
own homes and their country. He referred to his attitudes towards Bolshevism and stood 
by them, but in resounding words declared them irrelevant, when the Soviets were 
engaged with Britain’s enemy. He thus from the beginning finessed the problem of 
divided British opinion (which mostly split on class lines) by calling into being a 
comradeship-in-arms: 
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of their native land, guarding the fields which their fathers 
have tilled from time immemorial.… 
… my mind goes back across the years to the days when 
the Russian armies were our allies against the same deadly 
foe; when they fought with so much valour and constancy, 
and helped to gain a victory from all share in which, alas, 
they were—through no fault of ours—utterly cut off…. 
The Russian danger is therefore our danger, and the danger 
of the United States, just as the cause of any Russian 
fighting for his hearth and home is the cause of free men 
and free peoples in every quarter of the globe….19
 
 
In the next three months, Churchill urged his reluctant military staffs to seek ways 
of aiding the Soviets, but once it seemed more likely the Soviets would hold out until the 
winter (meaning there was no chance the Germans could turn back to invade Britain that 
year), Churchill became more reserved in his attitude. He occupied a middle-ground 
between the attitudes of his military, who resented sending any aid at all, and Lord 
Beaverbrook, the Minister of Supply, who was fired with enthusiasm for the Soviet 
cause. As the Soviets survived, though retreating back towards Moscow, the particular 
boundaries to Churchill’s readiness to embrace the Soviets as comrades became clear. He 
had already begun attempting to “woo” Stalin by telegram, as he had courted Roosevelt 
by telegram and telephone the previous year, but the result was what Eden’s left-inclining 
private secretary, Oliver Harvey, caustically described as “sentimental and florid” and 
offering “guff” as a substitute for guns.20 When Stalin made specific requests, Churchill 
was unforthcoming. Stalin asked that Britain declare war on Finland, Hungary and 
Romania, which had also attacked the USSR, and, in the absence of British land 
operations in France, the dispatch of British troops (he asked for twenty to thirty 
divisions) to the Soviet-German front. Churchill answered Cripps caustically when the 
ambassador pleaded Stalin’s case, arguing that Stalin had nothing with which to reproach 
Britain when he had let them stand alone in 1940.21 Churchill sent Beaverbrook to 
Moscow to negotiate a supply agreement in October 1941, but despite the line he took 
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with his own Chiefs of Staff, he warned Beaverbrook not to get carried away with the 
atmosphere in Moscow and allow Britain to be “bled white.”22 In the weeks following 
that meeting, Stalin criticised the British for failing to come to Soviet assistance, for 
failing to declare war on the Axis satellites, and for failing to answer the Soviet request 
for British troops to serve on the Soviet front.23 Churchill continued to respond gruffly to 
Stalin’s demands, and it took some collusion between Maisky and Eden in November 
1941 to cool down the atmosphere, by contriving a conciliatory Soviet message to which 
Churchill in turn felt able to reply in a more moderate fashion than he had originally 
intended. It is clear, from this little incident, that Churchill’s view of Stalin as an ally 
could be susceptible to influence by the form and language of Stalin’s communications.24
During one of his discussions with Beaverbrook in October, Stalin had suddenly 
proposed that there should be an Anglo-Soviet alliance.
 
25  In the absence of any means to 
give direct military aid, and concerned to bolster the Soviet will to resist, Eden went to 
Moscow to follow up the alliance suggestion.26 At the same time, Churchill travelled to 
the United States as a response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and on the British 
Empire in the East. Stalin demanded of Eden that the British recognise the annexations 
made by the Soviets during 1939-41 (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Eastern Poland, 
Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and parts of Finnish Karelia). Eden stalled him, but on his 
return to London argued that these demands should be conceded, in order to assuage 
Soviet suspicions, keep them fighting until Germany was completely defeated, and to 
build a post-war alliance to contain Germany.27
 Churchill shared the views of his American hosts that such a concession was 
inadvisable, claiming that what mattered to the Soviets were not political issues but 
military assistance and supplies of munitions. His lack of interest in working on a 
relationship with the Soviets, which Cripps found so regrettable and short-sighted, was 
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built as much on his focus on the United States as it was on his attitude to the Soviets.28 
With his hopes now brought to fruition by US entry into the war, this attitude reached its 
apogee at the very time that Stalin was pressing Eden on the need for closer co-operation 
and planning, based on agreed political objectives and strategy. Churchill’s responses to 
Eden were bullish: full of the first flush of optimism now that the USA was in the war, he 
asserted that the Soviets would have vast reconstruction needs after the war and would be 
faced with an economically strong Anglo-American bloc.29
The War Cabinet debated the Soviet frontier demands in February, with 
Beaverbrook and the Deputy Prime Minister, Labour Party leader Clement Attlee, lining 
up against each other.
  It was not long before it 
became evident that such simple assumptions about the solidarity and unanimity of 
Anglo-American co-operation were premature, and this had a significant impact in 
modifying Churchill’s attitude towards handling the Soviets. 
30 When he failed to persuade Churchill to make the concession, 
Beaverbrook resigned.31 However, within a month, Churchill had changed his mind. 
There is no clearly stated and authoritative reason for this volte-face in the documentary 
record. Carlton’s view is that Churchill was influenced by the growing pro-Soviet tide in 
British public opinion, and also that he was now considering the unwelcome prospect that 
the Soviets, not the Anglo-Americans, would be the principal victors in Europe. Eden 
was certainly arguing that US involvement in post-war European affairs should not be 
taken for granted, and that if one posited an Allied victory then one had to face the reality 
of increased Soviet influence.32 There is no direct evidence, however, that Churchill was 
thinking along these lines. He is often, indeed, represented as influenced not by 
apprehension of early Soviet victory, but by a fear they would suffer further catastrophic 
defeats. However, in March 1942, it was very unclear to British observers what the future 
held on the Soviet-German front. There were some signs that the Soviet winter counter-
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offensive, which had produced prematurely optimistic public statements by Stalin, had 
run out of momentum, but it was not clear where that would leave the Germans in terms 
of their ability to launch another massive offensive in the summer. There was thus no 
reason as yet for the British to consider drastic concessions to try to keep the Soviets in 
the war.33
While he had ordered an investigation into the feasibility of an invasion of 
Western Europe, such as the Soviets were demanding, Churchill had deep reservations 
about the strategic wisdom of such a move. His first flush of enthusiasm for his new 
American allies had also been diminished by their evident optimism about the 
possibilities of such an operation during 1942. It may well have been that these factors 
brought him to the conclusion to which Eden had come earlier, namely that political 
concessions were a preferable alternative to military operations that he thought would be 
a disaster. Whether he believed a separate peace between the Soviets and Germans to be a 
possibility at this time is uncertain: more likely is that he shared the feeling of the Foreign 
Office (FO) and of Beaverbrook that Soviet morale was weak, even at the top. An Anglo-
Soviet alliance would not, as FO Permanent Under-Secretary Sir Alexander Cadogan 
said, prevent Stalin doing a “double-cross” if he wanted to, but it might relieve some of 
his evident suspicions that the British were not committed to Soviet victory.
  
34 It might 
also ensure that if the Soviets were able to resume their advance, then they would not halt 
at their own frontiers, or resort to isolationism in the post-war period, leaving Britain to 
deal with a still-powerful Germany alone.35 Oliver Harvey and Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, General Alan Brooke, both noted at the start of March that Churchill was 
talking about going to see Stalin, and Brooke mentioned specifically that the purpose was 
to discuss post-war frontiers.36  
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A final element might have been pique with the Americans: the State Department 
had been very dismissive of the FO’s views on the frontiers, and were clearly suspicious 
that British policy still inclined naturally towards appeasement (this time of the Soviets). 
Even worse, Roosevelt had weighed in with the comment that Stalin distrusted the 
British, but liked him better, so perhaps things could be settled between the two of 
them.37 Despite his determination to be the best of friends with Roosevelt, Churchill was 
not prepared to concede to him the leadership in Allied-Soviet relations, and Roosevelt’s 
attitude may well have strengthened Churchill’s readiness to seize the initiative, in order 
to achieve a closer Anglo-Soviet relationship. Roosevelt’s evident intention, not only to 
forge a personal relationship with Stalin, but also to speak for the British as well, 
certainly seems to have struck Churchill, for even though he had indicated to the War 
Cabinet on 16 March that he agreed with Roosevelt, he made his own bid to play that role 
when he asked Maisky whether Stalin would welcome a visit from himself.38
By then, the nascent alliance had been formally established in the Anglo-Soviet 
Treaty, though without an agreement on frontiers. Molotov had come to London and had 
agreed to a twenty-year treaty of co-operation in place of an overtly political 
arrangement, but he thought he had secured what the Soviets primarily wanted: a promise 
from Roosevelt of a second front in 1942. Churchill had been at pains to point out to him 
that no promise had been made, only a statement that they would urgently investigate the 
possibilities.
 He was 
thinking of somewhere like Baku or Astrakhan. Maisky thought Stalin would come and 
meet him, but the idea was not taken further until the end of July 1942. 
39 The British had then persuaded the Americans that even a large-scale raid, 
code-named SLEDGEHAMMER, was out of the question in 1942. Churchill and Roosevelt 
had agreed instead, against the inclinations of their military advisors, to launch an 
invasion of French North Africa, code-named GYMNAST (later changed to TORCH).40 The 
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decision coincided unfortunately with the disaster of PQ17, the latest Anglo-American 
convoy bringing supplies to the USSR, which left Iceland on 27 June. Fearing attack by 
the German battleship Tirpitz, the Royal Navy escort had been withdrawn, and the ships 
ordered to proceed independently. German submarines and aircraft took a terrible toll; 
only nine out of thirty-four reached Soviet ports. Churchill’s first response was to cancel 
any further such convoys until the end of the year. Moreover, the German offensive had 
indeed materialised, and by July the Soviet armies were in full retreat back towards the 
Caucasus.41
According to our naval experts, the arguments of British 
naval experts on the necessity of stopping delivery of war 
supplies to the northern harbours of the U.S.S.R. are 
untenable. They are convinced that, given goodwill and 
readiness to honour obligations, steady deliveries could be 
effected with heavy loss to the Germans…. Of course I do 
not think steady deliveries to northern Soviet ports are 
possible without risk or loss. But then no major task can be 
carried out in wartime without risk or losses.… I never 
imagined that the British Government would deny us 
delivery of war materials precisely now, when the Soviet 
Union is badly in need of them in view of the grave 
situation on the Soviet-German front…. 
 Stalin’s reaction to Churchill’s news was, unsurprisingly, bitter and 
reproachful: 
As to … opening a second front in Europe, I fear the 
matter is taking an improper turn. In view of the situation 
on the Soviet-German front, I state most emphatically that 
the Soviet Government cannot tolerate the second front in 
Europe being postponed till 1943. 
I hope you will not take it amiss that I have seen fit to 
give you my frank and honest opinion and that of my 
colleagues on the points raised in your message.42
 
 
Britain had suffered its own setbacks in the Western Desert, having lost Tobruk in June: 
by July Axis forces commanded by General Erwin Rommel had advanced as far as 
Alamein in Egypt, just sixty miles from Alexandria. Typically, Churchill decided to go 
out in person and address what he suspected was a problem in the high command of the 
British forces. Without knowing of Churchill’s plans, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, who had 
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replaced Cripps in Moscow in March 1942, wrote of his concern at Soviet reactions to the 
news concerning the second front and the convoys. Clark Kerr was an eccentric and 
unconventional diplomat, who attached great importance to personal interactions and 
emotional responses. Unlike Cripps, he had got on well in his first meeting with Stalin 
(the political situation having changed greatly) and felt that in a similar face-to-face 
meeting, Churchill would be able to impress Stalin with his fighting spirit and thereby 
modify the impression given by the recent decisions that the British were not prepared to 
engage the enemy to help the Soviets.43 He suggested that Molotov might well have failed 
to convey this fighting spirit when he reported back to Stalin after his London mission. 
Clark Kerr suggested that a personal visit was the only way to explain the second front 
decision to Stalin, and thought it would be beneficial for the alliance as a whole for the 
two men finally to meet each other. Eden showed the telegram to Churchill, who was 
immediately taken with the idea and resolved to go on from Egypt to meet Stalin.44
Churchill wired to Stalin: 
  
We could survey the war together and take decisions hand-
in-hand. I could then tell you plans we have made with 
President Roosevelt for offensive action in 1942.45
 
 
The idea appealed to Churchill for the same reasons that he had been considering such a 
trip earlier, now revived in his mind by Clark Kerr’s suggestion. He later described his 
mission as “like carrying a large lump of ice to the North Pole,” but his aim was never 
simply to break the news that the second front would be in French North Africa, not 
Northern France.46 That could be done by telegram; to go in person would only expose 
Churchill directly to Soviet reproaches. Churchill’s decision to make this dangerous 
journey, about which he was clearly apprehensive, was based on his desire to do more 
than simply be an unwelcome messenger. Talking to Stalin in person was something he 
had been wishing to do since March, when it became obvious that strategic planning with 
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the Americans would not be the smooth matter he originally anticipated. Success in 
persuading Stalin of the wisdom of TORCH would open up the possibility of persuading 
him to share Churchill’s overall strategic vision: “closing the ring” by operations on the 
Axis periphery (notably in the Mediterranean and Norway, and by involving Turkey in 
the war) combined with relentless strategic bombing of Germany. This would have the 
further effect, and one that Churchill would welcome, of starting meaningful Big Three 
co-operation with a bias towards Churchill’s own strategic inclinations. He was going to 
Moscow fresh from discovering that American planners had quite different strategic 
views, which meant that the reality of the Anglo-American part of Big Three co-
operation was not going to be the smooth process, based on shared culture and values, 
that he had first anticipated when sending his telegram in December 1941 to Eden in 
Moscow. Even though they had not been followed up beyond a conversation with the 
Soviet Ambassador, Roosevelt’s suggestions that he should handle the Soviets for the 
two of them, taken with this strategic divergence, led Churchill to seek to mould the still-
undefined Allied relationship with the Soviets. None of this was stated explicitly by 
Churchill, but when viewed in this light, much of what Churchill said and did in Moscow 
is explained.  
Churchill asked again to meet in Astrakhan or the Caucasus: Stalin insisted that 
he could not leave Moscow during the “intense struggle” on the Soviet front. This is often 
depicted as typical Stalin callousness, exposing the 67-year old Churchill to an extra eight 
hundred miles of hazardous flying, but Stalin had a genuine reason to wish to keep at the 
centre of the direction of the war, quite apart from his own aversion to flying, with his 
vital southern front collapsing before his eyes. Churchill left for Egypt on 1 August, 
having written to King George VI that his hope for the Moscow leg of the trip was that “I 
may perhaps make the situation less edged.” His objectives for the mission actually seem 
EnterText 6.2 
Martin H. Folly: Seeking Comradeship 282 
to have been little more than this hope. There were no preparatory briefs from either the 
Foreign Office or the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Beaverbrook and another close 
Churchill confidant, Brendan Bracken, newly appointed Minister of Information, both 
wanted to go, probably to increase their standing with the British public. On advice from 
Eden, Churchill did not take them, but he did not take Eden either—only Cadogan from 
the Foreign Office and Brooke to represent the Chiefs of Staff, supplemented by other 
military figures from the Middle East command.47
Actual exchange with Roosevelt regarding this mission had also reflected the 
nature both of the enterprise, and of Churchill’s subtle emplacing of himself as the 
intermediary with Stalin and the voice of Anglo-American strategy. On 29 July, Churchill 
wrote to Roosevelt, “I do not propose to embark on an argument, but Stalin will no doubt 
expect some account of our recent conversations here on the second front.” At this point 
still referring to communication by telegram, he suggested that he should cite the 
memorandum he had given Molotov in June making clear no promise had been made to 
open a second front in 1942, but then go on to say that “certain action” had been agreed, 
while giving no information as to time or place.
 All this reflected both the rather ad 
hoc nature of the mission and also Churchill’s main purpose, which was personally to 
engage with Stalin. For that he needed no advisors present. Rather belatedly, once he was 
in the Middle East, he decided he would like an American representative with him and, 
with Roosevelt’s permission, Averell Harriman joined the mission while Churchill was in 
Cairo. This may well have been influenced by the fact that Churchill found Harriman, 
Roosevelt’s personal envoy in London, a most congenial travelling companion.  
48
I agree with you that your reply to Stalin must be handled 
with great care. We have got always to bear in mind the 
 Roosevelt felt that Stalin should be told 
more definitely that there would be action, without giving definite details, and argued for 
understanding of Stalin’s position: 
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personality of our ally and the very difficult and dangerous 
situation that confronts him. No-one can be expected to 
approach the war from a world point of view whose 
country has been invaded. I think we should try to put 
ourselves in his place.49
 
 
After Clark Kerr’s suggestion of a personal meeting Churchill resolved to go much 
further in confiding in Stalin than Roosevelt was suggesting. He was under greater 
domestic pressure to show that action was being taken to help the Soviets than was 
Roosevelt (American public pressure was more Pacific-oriented), but this also reflected 
the way Churchill had already been manoeuvring, by taking on himself the task of 
telegramming to Stalin on strategic as well as convoy matters. He proceeded to ask Stalin 
to join him in a meeting before putting the idea to Roosevelt—he simply informed the 
president that he had done so, and wrote, “I hope you will authorise me to tell him what 
we have settled. I am sure I can state the case in all its bearings.”50 Roosevelt did not 
directly reply to this, and initially rejected Harriman’s suggestion that he accompany 
Churchill, feeling it might imply that Harriman was keeping an eye on Churchill. He was 
glad to acquiesce when Churchill requested Harriman’s presence. Having received no 
response from Roosevelt to his plan to go to Moscow, Churchill had wired, “I should 
greatly like to have your aid and countenance in my talks with Joe…. I feel that things 
would be easier if we all seemed to be together. I have a somewhat raw job.”51 Taking 
Harriman in this way, who did not have the status of an official presidential envoy to the 
Soviets, meant that Churchill had the advantage of appearing to have American 
endorsement for what he would say, while not being encumbered by an equal-ranking 
American participant, who could intervene in the discussion or in other ways impede the 
development of a Churchill-Stalin bilateral relationship. Roosevelt was happy to have 
Harriman there, reporting back to him what was said, but with no responsibility: “I think 
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your idea is sound and I am telling Stalin Harriman will be at his disposal to help in any 
way.”52
On 7 August, Ivan Maisky set out for Stalin what he thought were the reasons for 
Churchill’s wish to meet him. He saw three main objectives in Churchill’s mind, and 
allowing for Maisky’s ideological bias and his need to keep in step with the views of his 
leader, he was strikingly perceptive. He saw one reason to be the need to deflect public 
and parliamentary criticism about the lack of military operations in support of the 
Soviets. Another, which he saw to be a significant factor, was Churchill’s desire to 
formulate a unified strategy, and, interestingly, Maisky noted that Churchill “wants to 
serve as a link between the United States and the Soviet Union in this respect.” Maisky 
thought that “Churchill has set himself the task of establishing a close personal contact 
with Comrade Stalin, somehow dovetailing Anglo-American strategic plans with Soviet 
plans.” Maisky believed Churchill’s third objective to be the avoidance of a second front, 
at least partly because he believed the British army was not up to it. He predicted that 
Churchill would present other and “less daunting” ways of helping the Soviet Union, 
such as strategic bombing, and joint operations in the North. Maisky suggested using the 
meeting to press for more supplies, if a second front was not going to materialise, and to 
start to forge a unified allied strategy. Maisky’s message, only recently available, sheds 
interesting light not only on Churchill, but also on Stalin’s conduct of their meetings.
  
53
Now accompanied by his rather lightweight team of Harriman, Cadogan, Air 
Marshal Tedder of the Desert Air Force and Generals Brooke and Wavell, Churchill set 
off for Moscow via Teheran, arriving, with only his entourage and Harriman, on 12 
August.
 
54 Churchill’s first meeting took place with Stalin later that day. It was a small-
scale, intimate affair, with Churchill accompanied only by Clark Kerr, Harriman and the 
embassy interpreter, Charles Dunlop.55 For such an important meeting, Churchill had 
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done little preparation (it was not his habit to seek much in the way of briefing from his 
experts, particularly the diplomatic ones), and was relying on his personality to win over 
Stalin, whom he had come rather to underestimate as a simple-minded “peasant.” It is a 
common criticism of Roosevelt that he placed too much reliance on his ability to “charm” 
Stalin: Churchill’s approach to this mission suggests that reliance on charm was not 
confined to Roosevelt, and indeed later in the mission, Stalin himself made an attempt 
(ultimately quite successful) to “charm” his guest.  
In addressing his task, Churchill adopted a tactic he had used before, with 
Roosevelt.56 He began by stating the worst aspect to a problem, and then gave his 
compromise solution, which if presented at the start would have seemed inadequate. This 
approach appeared to bear fruit in this opening meeting. Churchill delivered the bad news 
immediately and without equivocation, telling Stalin that Anglo-American planners had 
ruled out a cross-Channel invasion in 1942. Stalin again expressed his disappointment 
with this decision, but Churchill sweetened the pill with a somewhat exaggerated 
description of the destruction being caused by British strategic bombing of Germany. He 
then sprang on the Soviet leader the plan to land in French North Africa. He drew a 
crocodile and said they would attack its soft belly as well as the hard snout. Stalin 
responded, “may God help this enterprise to succeed.” He quickly identified four reasons 
why this operation was advantageous: that it would attack the enemy in his undefended 
rear, it would make the Germans and French fight each other, it would put Italy out of 
action, and it would keep the Spaniards neutral.57 From these remarks it appears that 
Stalin anticipated that the operations in the Mediterranean would expand beyond 
TORCH’s ostensible objective of the liberation of North Africa. 
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Clark Kerr took the official minutes, and in addition left in his private office 
papers an account giving more “colour,” which gives a remarkable picture of this 
important event: 
It was interesting to watch the impact of the two men. 
Clash and recoil and clash again, and then a slow but 
unmistakeable coming together as each got the measure of 
the other, and in the end, much apparent understanding and 
goodwill. To me who am in a way responsible for the 
meeting it meant some very anxious moments. But at the 
end of today’s meeting I felt satisfied that it had been 
abundantly wise. Now the two men know each other and 
each one will be able to put the right value on the 
messages—and they are very frequent—that pass between 
them. At times both were very blunt, as if each one sought 
by his bluntness to make a dint upon the other. I think that 
each succeeded and that the dints were deep. Each one was 
very restless. Stalin kept getting up and walking across the 
big room to a writing table into which he delved for 
cigarettes. These he tore to bits and stuffed into his absurd 
curly pipe. In his turn the P.M., when he had shot a bolt, 
got up and had a walk, pulling from his heated buttocks the 
seat of his trousers which had clearly stuck to them.… 
There was something about this dumpy figure plucking at 
his backside which suggested immense strength but little 
distinction…. 
… [later] The PM was in very good humour, he felt that he 
had got away with it… Harriman … tended, I thought to 
bumsuck the P.M. and the P.M. liked it.58
 
 
Churchill thus came away from the meeting believing that he had managed to carry it off. 
He telegrammed to the War Cabinet that “courtesy and dignity had failed,” but that 
Stalin’s four points in favour of TORCH had shown his “swift and complete mastery of a 
hitherto novel problem.” He concluded optimistically, “I expect I shall establish a solid 
and sincere relationship with this man.”59
The self-congratulation was premature, however, and may have had an effect on 
what followed. One of the significant facts of the trip was that Churchill was 
accommodated at State Villa Number Seven, which was Stalin’s own dacha, rather than 
at the British Embassy. Churchill gloated to the newly arrived British military 
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representatives that Stalin was a peasant whom he knew how to handle. Too late did Air 
Marshal Arthur Tedder warn of the likelihood that the dacha was bugged.60
Whether such eavesdropping had an effect on Soviet attitudes is unclear, but 
certainly the mood had changed by the next day, and an issue Churchill thought had been 
resolved was revealed to be very much still in dispute. Warning signs were evident in the 
morning when Molotov observed to Churchill that there was no certainty the North 
African operation would go ahead—after all, the second front was not going to, despite 
Roosevelt’s statement in June that it would.
  
61
M. STALIN suggested that higher sacrifices were called 
for. Ten thousand men a day were being sacrificed on the 
Russian front.… The Russians did not complain of the 
sacrifices they were making, but the extent of them should 
be recognised. 
 This was just a prelude to the storm that 
Stalin unleashed later. He presented a memorandum criticising not only the decision not 
to open a second front, but also the delivery of equipment to the Red Army and its 
quality. He then released a stream of invective at Churchill, accusing the British Army 
and Navy of cowardice, and the Allies of breaking faith and of failing to acknowledge the 
significance of the Soviet struggle. According to Colonel Ian Jacob, who took the 
minutes for the British, the effect of this was made even worse by the crude English of 
Vladimir Pavlov, Stalin’s interpreter. These official minutes do not convey the full 
flavour of the meeting in the same way that Clark Kerr’s more impressionistic (and less 
professional) account of the first meeting had done, but even so, some idea of Stalin’s 
bitterness comes across: 
MR. CHURCHILL said that he envied the Russians their 
glory, and he hoped that we very soon would show by our 
deeds that the Democracies were neither sluggish nor 
cowardly and were just as ready as the Russians to shed 
blood…. The existence of the oceans and the need to move 
over them in ships were facts for which it hardly seemed 
right that we should be reproached. 
 He earnestly desired to hear the ring of comradeship in 
the discussions. He well knew what the Russians were 
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going through: we ourselves had fought alone for a year…. 
He had come a long way in the hope that he would receive 
the hand of comradeship and that he would be believed in a 
spirit of loyalty and friendship…. It grieved his heart that 
the Russians did not think we were doing our utmost in the 
common cause.  
M. STALIN said that it was not a case of mistrust, but only 
of a divergence of view…. He felt that if the British army 
had been fighting the Germans as much as the Russian 
Army, it would not be so frightened of them. The Russians, 
and indeed the R.A.F. had shown that it was possible to 
beat the Germans. The British infantry could do the same 
provided they acted at the same time as the Russians. 
MR. CHURCHILL said that he pardoned the remark which 
M. Stalin had made on account of the bravery of the 
Russian Army. 62
 
 
Churchill described this as  “a most unpleasant discussion.” Stalin, he wrote, had 
said a great many insulting things:  
I repulsed these squarely, but without taunts. I suppose he 
is not used to being contradicted repeatedly, but he did not 
become at all angry or animated. He kept his eyes half 
closed, always avoiding mine, uttering at intervals a string 
of insults…. He will have to go a long way to do any good 
with me.63
 
 
In launching this attack, it is generally assumed that Stalin was following a favourite 
ploy: to appear conciliatory at the first meeting, raising expectations in those he was 
dealing with, then taking an obstructionist stance, followed by a slight softening of 
attitude that would come as such a relief that it would be seen to be praiseworthy 
statesmanship. An alternative is that he was letting off steam, either for his own sake, or 
to satisfy hard-liners in the Politburo (as Churchill speculated to the War Cabinet).64 He 
may well also have felt that he had missed a trick by being too understanding at the first 
meeting, and he now wished to build up some negotiating capital by not accepting the 
Anglo-American plan without gaining something in return. Clark Kerr believed that he 
may well have been carried away by the skilful way Churchill had unveiled TORCH at the 
first meeting, but had since cooled off, and having consulted “his own boys” decided he 
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might still have a chance of diverting the attack from North Africa to Europe.65 There is 
also the possibility, in view of what Maisky had written on 7 August, that Stalin was 
attempting, extremely crudely, to talk Churchill out of his fear of pitting the British army 
against the Germans: Maisky’s report to Stalin of Churchill’s attitude gives an extra layer 
of meaning to Stalin’s remark about it not being hard to fight the Germans once you got 
started—it may not have been meant as an insult, but as an encouragement, but this was 
lost in the inadequacies of translation. Whatever Stalin’s motivation, all it did was draw 
forth a bullish response from Churchill, who, like Stalin, dropped diplomatic form and 
delivered an eloquent and rhetorical speech. He said that he had come to try and establish 
real comradeship, only for his motives and sincerity to be questioned: there was no “ring 
of comradeship” in Stalin’s attitude. Dunlop, the interpreter, proved as inadequate for the 
task as Pavlov had been, and stumbled in translating Churchill’s words (though in his 
defence, Churchill tended to take little account of the needs of the translator once he had 
launched into full-blown rhetoric). At one point, according to Jacob’s later recollections, 
Stalin stopped Churchill and said that he did not understand the words but admired the 
fighting spirit evident in Churchill’s tone. Both men having vented their spleen, though 
through inadequate interpretation, the mood calmed a little. The discussion shifted to the 
situation in the Caucasus and Stalin offered the British soldiers who were present a 
demonstration of the Katyusha rocket launcher.66
During the meeting, Harriman had passed Churchill a note that a similar change in 
mood had been evident in the second meeting with Stalin in October 1941, implying that 
this may have been either a tactic, or a result of pressure from behind the scenes.
  
67 This 
suggestion did not mollify Churchill, however, and he came away from the meeting 
deeply disgruntled. He was inclined not to attend the state dinner, since Stalin had been 
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so offensive. When Clark Kerr called at the dacha the following morning, he found 
Churchill to be like a  
wounded lion. He declaimed against Stalin in ponderous 
Gibbonesque periods…. He declared he was damned if he 
would keep his engagement to dine with Stalin tonight.68
 
 
His method of handling Stalin had failed, but once again his lack of diplomatic finesse 
may have saved the day. His mood would have been evident to any of the Soviet listeners 
of the goings-on at the dacha, and he made little attempt to hide it at the lavish Kremlin 
banquet given in his honour, which Churchill finally did grudgingly agree to attend. He 
chose, however to dress in his remarkable one-piece garment that was sometimes called 
his “siren suit.” The Soviets, who were punctilious with regard to etiquette, were all, of 
course, in formal dress or uniform and must have been greatly taken aback, if not 
insulted. However, perhaps himself perceiving that his own tactics had gone awry, Stalin 
had reverted to his congenial persona, making toasts and sharing humorous remarks with 
his colleagues. For a time Churchill cheered up under Stalin’s flattery, but the mood 
faded, when Churchill asked if he was forgiven for his past (meaning his efforts to defeat 
the Bolshevik revolution) and Stalin replied, “Who am I to forgive. Only God can 
forgive.”69 Stalin continued in party mood, but his bonhomie increasingly grated on 
Churchill. Stalin’s habit of moving around the room to clink glasses with people he was 
toasting, and the restrictions of interpretation, magnified Churchill’s grumpy mood. 
Though normally such lavish food and drink would have appealed to him, he now 
seemed to find it distasteful.70 He perked up for a photograph session, but when Stalin 
suggested watching a film, Churchill abruptly took his leave. There is no evidence that 
this was a contrived tactic, but as a riposte to Stalin’s own earlier demonstration of pique, 
it was an effective response. Stalin followed Churchill to the door, jogging to keep up; an 
unprecedented gesture from the Vozhd’, and probably a remarkable sight for onlookers.71 
EnterText 6.2 
Martin H. Folly: Seeking Comradeship 291 
Back at the dacha, Churchill voiced his discontent eloquently, saying he would 
leave Stalin to fight his own battles. “I ought not to have come,” he said, though he added 
that he might be able to work with “that man,” but for the language barrier. But, he told 
Wilson, his doctor, he had deliberately said “Goodbye,” not “Good evening,” and said, “I 
am going to leave this man to fight his own battles.”72 According to Clark Kerr and 
Wilson, the mood was no better the following day. The ambassador has left a detailed 
account of his attempt to persuade Churchill to make one more effort to get on with Stalin 
(again confirming that this was one of the ostensible purposes of the mission). Clark 
Kerr’s account of the conversation is typically colourful and cannot be verified, but there 
is no reason to doubt its general veracity.73 According to the ambassador, he argued to 
Churchill that the Soviets were indeed rough and inexperienced, fresh from the plough or 
the lathe. They said what they thought. However, that was just their manner, and too 
much should not be read into it. Churchill could not afford to risk the Soviets going their 
own way in the war, and it would play badly with British public opinion. He should use 
all his personal charm to overcome Stalin’s unfortunate manner. Churchill muttered that 
he had been insulted, but Clark Kerr pressed that he could not risk the USSR being 
defeated as a result of his inaction, and it was up to him to use his skills to patch things 
up. It was in his power, said Clark Kerr, to “nobble Stalin.” According to the 
ambassador’s account, Churchill was persuaded by these arguments not to leave in a huff, 
but to give Stalin one more chance. Whether Churchill ever seriously intended leaving 
early, we cannot know. Wilson and Clark Kerr thought his threat genuine.74
Jacob’s account makes much less of Churchill’s mood, saying that Churchill was 
already reconsidering the implications of the second meeting with Stalin before Clark 
Kerr arrived at the dacha. Jacob noted in his diary that it was he who suggested that 
Churchill meet Stalin again. He also suggested using the interpreter who had done the job 
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at the military meetings, Major Arthur Birse.75 Clark Kerr arrived after Jacob had left for 
a meeting, so it is possible that the ambassador gave parallel advice. He was encouraged 
to do so by Cadogan and by Wilson. So Jacob could have underestimated the continuing 
strength of Churchill’s feelings. It is tempting to think that Churchill was making a show 
for the microphones, and did not seriously intend to leave without another attempt at 
winning Stalin over to his point of view.  None of the accounts written at the time 
suggests this, but Cadogan had been involved in just such a ruse during Eden’s visit in 
December.  A Machiavellian tactic like this is somewhat out of keeping with the usual 
depiction of Churchill as rather an instinctive and emotional man, but Churchill, an 
immensely experienced politician, was quite capable of subterfuge.76 It is perhaps 
suggestive that when Clark Kerr arrived to speak to him they went outside and walked in 
the garden, away from prying ears—even though it was an unsatisfactory place to hold a 
conversation because of the need to walk in single file. On the other hand, Clark Kerr 
clearly thought Churchill needed to be persuaded.77
The result was that Cadogan sought out Molotov to arrange a further meeting. He 
was stalled for hours: this seems to have been a deliberate Soviet ploy, for some time in 
the afternoon Stalin’s daughter was told to prepare to have Churchill over for dinner—
even though when the meeting was finally arranged there was no mention of dinner, and 
indeed Churchill made arrangements to dine with the Polish General Anders after he had 
spoken for an hour or so with Stalin. He left, however, with the parting words that he 
would not leave the Kremlin until Stalin was “in his pocket.”
  
78
As it happened, the meeting, as Stalin seems to have intended, lasted for over 
seven hours, from 7 p.m. to 3 a.m., even though neither man had any particular objective 
in mind. British accounts of the meeting are limited to those of Churchill himself and his 
new interpreter, Birse. Stalin once again turned on the charm. Both had made their points 
 
EnterText 6.2 
Martin H. Folly: Seeking Comradeship 293 
in their earlier meetings, and now relaxed somewhat in each other’s company. They had 
no agenda and no burning issues on which they needed to take a stand or produce 
agreements. Consequently, the discussion was wide-ranging, of a kind that Churchill 
always seemed to enjoy. Churchill began by saying, “I hope that nothing stands between 
us. I came, apart from direct business, with the earnest wish for a personal 
understanding.”79 According to the Soviet record, Stalin said in reply, “The fact that he 
and Churchill had met and got to know each other [literally ‘friend to friend’] and had 
prepared the ground for future agreements, had great significance. He was inclined to 
look at the matter more optimistically.” As Edmonds points out, there was no need for 
him to say this if he did not mean it.80 After a while, Stalin sprang his invitation to “go 
for a drink” in his flat. Churchill replied that he was in principle always in favour of such 
a policy. They then made the short journey through the Kremlin to Stalin’s modest 
personal apartments. There they ate a fork buffet, served by Stalin’s housekeeper and by 
Svetlana Stalina, and joined at Stalin’s suggestion by Molotov. Jibes were made at 
Molotov’s expense. Churchill said that while in the US, Molotov had secretly gone off to 
see New York City. No, said Stalin, it had been Chicago, “where the other gangsters 
live.” Stalin excused the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939 on the grounds that it was 
made to buy time and because he felt the British and French were not sincere in their own 
proposals for an agreement. Churchill even got him talking about collectivisation and the 
fate of the kulaks (which Stalin blamed on the hostility of the poorer peasants towards the 
wealthier smallholders, and the pressing need to mechanise).81
It was getting late, even by Churchill’s standards, when a roast sucking pig was 
brought in. This was too much for Churchill, but it was around Stalin’s usual dinnertime. 
Cadogan was called for, and after refusing Stalin’s invitation to join him in dissecting the 
pig, he and Molotov contrived a somewhat bland but essentially positive joint 
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communiqué. This was an outcome that had seemed highly unlikely twenty-four hours 
earlier. Back at the dacha, while his bath was run (to prevent electronic eavesdropping?), 
Churchill spoke to Clark Kerr and Jacob and expressed his satisfaction with the outcome 
of his trip. He felt he had reached a personal relationship with Stalin similar to that with 
Roosevelt (an indication, like his “comradeship” remark to Stalin, that this was all along 
a prime objective of his).82 He telegraphed to Attlee that he and Stalin had got on easy 
and friendly terms—“I feel I have established a personal relationship which will be 
helpful.”83 Clark Kerr agreed; Jacob was more dubious. He did concede that Churchill 
had got further with Stalin than anyone else could have, but actually to make friends with 
Stalin would be equivalent to making friends with a python.84 However, Molotov wrote 
to Maisky that although the negotiations had not been smooth, the “extensive 
conversation in Comrade Stalin’s private residence” produced “a close personal rapport 
with the guest.”85
Churchill had thus activated the personal element of the second wing of the war-
winning Grand Alliance, to follow on from his journeys across the Atlantic. Indeed, the 
meeting was to remain the sole face-to-face contact of either Churchill or Roosevelt with 
Stalin until November 1943. It is easy, however, to dismiss it as of no significance.
 At 5.30 in the morning, with Molotov having come to see him off, 
Churchill and his party flew back to Teheran. 
86 The 
Soviets went on to fight, and win, their own battles, and it is unlikely that another way of 
conveying Churchill’s bad news would have produced a different military outcome. No 
formal agreements were reached, except a vague one on the principle of sharing 
information and another on the deployment of Anglo-American aircraft squadrons in the 
Caucasus.87 No progress was made on political issues. Topics like the Soviet frontiers 
and Poland that were still major subjects of contention were not even touched upon. 
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There are also grounds for arguing that the Churchill-Stalin relationship remained full of 
suspicion.88
To leave it at that, however, may be to miss the more intangible, but perhaps 
significant, aspects of the meetings in Moscow. The objective was never to reach firm 
agreements on substantive matters, but to test whether the two leaders, and their two 
states, could find some common foundations on which to build an alliance and overcome 
the sense of disconnectedness between their various war efforts that had become evident 
in the light of recent events. Churchill and Stalin had found common ground in their own 
discussion of military matters, as evidenced in their discussion of the relative merits of 
Churchill’s ancestor the Duke of Marlborough, and the Duke of Wellington, as military 
commanders.
  
89 In addition, and of some importance for Churchill, Stalin had seemed 
enthusiastic about Churchill’s pet scheme of a joint invasion of North Norway, and 
agreed with him about the desirability of getting Turkey into the war (though not 
optimistic it could be achieved). In this sense, Churchill might well have felt that Stalin’s 
views of future strategy were preferable to that of some of the Americans, hence his 
declaration of respect for Stalin’s “sure-footed and quick military judgement” and his 
sense of achievement at the end of the mission.90
 Churchill was not a naïve or simplistic statesman and, as with his personal 
relationship with Roosevelt, he remained aware that political differences had not been 
expunged by inter-personal cordiality. He had been trusting in his ability to win over a 
supposedly simple, peasant-minded, Soviet leader by strength of rhetoric. Stalin’s refusal 
to be charmed left him without an alternative strategy. However, the final result, the last 
meeting when the air had been cleared and the reality of mutual need had dawned on both 
leaders, produced a long-lasting sense that at the heart of the impersonal, grim and 
ruthless Soviet state was a human figure who was capable of frankness and humour, and 
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who appeared in the last resort to attach importance to Churchill and his good opinion. 
He returned with an attitude to Stalin that was, if anything, more full of ambiguities than 
before, but one which, right to the end of the war, contained as one important element the 
sense that this was a man who could be dealt with. Churchill later said that if he could 
dine with Stalin once a week then all the difficulties would be capable of resolution.91
That Churchill regarded Stalin in such a positive light can partly be explained by 
the unexpected rapport of the final meeting, but it is also necessary to take into account 
the underlying purpose of the mission, which was rooted in the still embryonic nature of 
the Big Three relationship. As has been discussed above, the issue of the frontiers earlier 
in the year had quickly become overlaid with issues concerning how the partnership with 
the Soviets was to be managed, and who was best suited to lead it on the Anglo-
American side. As Churchill’s comments concerning “comradeship” demonstrate, getting 
to know Stalin was to all intents and purposes the aim of the trip. Given the news 
Churchill was bearing regarding the second front, the prospects were not good, but if 
successful, it would place Churchill in a position where Roosevelt could no longer claim 
that he had an advantage in relations with Stalin and should therefore make the running 
on behalf of the Anglo-American partnership. Coming so quickly after his June trip to 
Washington, BRACELET put Churchill in a good position to be the lynchpin or broker of 
the Grand Alliance. In Moscow, he had obtained a sympathetic audience, possibly even 
support, for his strategic vision for the pursuit of victory. If these were its aims, then the 
mission must be judged a success.  
  
With regard to the meeting’s impact on Stalin’s attitudes, Clark Kerr concluded 
that Churchill by the force of his personality had dispelled the “long-standing and 
tenacious suspicions which have clouded the judgement of Stalin.” He exaggerated: the 
conference clearly did not do that, but it may have been important in convincing Stalin 
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that the British would not themselves make a separate peace—a matter of some concern 
since the flight of Rudolf Hess to Britain in May 1941.92 Clark Kerr concluded that Stalin 
actually enjoyed Churchill’s company, since there were few in the USSR with whom he 
could converse on such terms. If speculations about Stalin’s inferiority complex had any 
grain of truth to them, then such meetings may well have brought satisfaction to Stalin by 
confirming his new-found status as a world statesman.93 In that case, the simple fact of 
Churchill having gone there and shown his personality in such an undiplomatic, but 
ultimately honest, manner, should not be underestimated. Churchill and Stalin had been 
able to get the measure of each other, and each had made a contribution, difficult though 
they found it personally, to averting a disastrous breach in relations—and, more 
importantly, came intuitively to a basis on which the alliance could proceed. In this 
context, Stalin’s remark to Churchill about getting to know each other as friends was 
telling. It was a “strange alliance” for them, and for Roosevelt too, and nothing in their 
previous political experience, extensive though it was, had prepared them for it, nor did 
their shared interest in history provide much in the way of a blueprint or guidelines as to 
how to manage this relationship. In mid-1942 it was possible for it to go in two 
directions—the war could continue to be fought as two (or more) separate conflicts. The 
alliance did not come into being fully formed, with regard to the manner in which the 
three leaders would relate to each other and manage issues of tension and 
political/strategic disagreement. The BRACELET mission to Moscow represents a crucial 
first stage, in which the two leaders, neither conceding ground on an issue that divided 
them profoundly, came to the conclusion that notwithstanding this, they could find scope 
for co-operation and sensed that each valued the other’s contribution to what they 
(crucially) agreed was a common enterprise—this was implied in Churchill’s key use of 
the term “comradeship,” which had practical as much as sentimental connotations. 
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Relations had been founded upon the discussion of strategic issues, not political ones. 
Roosevelt is often characterised as the one who swept political issues under the carpet in 
the cause of short-term Allied unity—BRACELET shows Churchill and Stalin doing so 
before Roosevelt was really in the game. The essentially pragmatic basis for the conduct 
of the Grand Alliance—a way of managing potential disagreements by offsetting them 
and framing the relationship as primarily a warrior alliance—was established. It may 
have been vital for seeing the Alliance through to its victory.94
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